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6
The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation
Adam Lerner
Some people care about doing the right thing as such. They want to do the
right thing under that description. These people have what has come to be
known as a de dicto desire to do what is right.¹
Some people who have a desire to do what’s right as such desire to do
what’s right only as a means. They want to do the right thing in order to
avoid punishment, or as a way of doing what God or their mother would
approve of, or because it would be a sign that they are predestined for
salvation. But many care about doing the right thing for its own sake:
because it’s the right thing. They have a ﬁnal desire to do what’s right as
such. This desire is an instance of what I will call pure moral motivation
(PMM).² Other instances of PMM include the desire to avoid doing what’s
wrong as such, the desire to promote what’s good as such, and the desire to
prevent what’s bad as such.
Contemporary views in metaethics have been built to satisfy familiar
desiderata: accommodating Moorean open questions, explaining the con-
nection between moral judgment and moral motivation, accounting for the
supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, and many others. In this
chapter, I introduce a new desideratum: vindicating the rationality of
PMM. I argue that PMM is often rational, and that any adequate view
must accommodate this fact. The puzzle of PMM is to explain how that can
be done. I argue that solving the puzzle poses a serious challenge for the
standard views in metaethics.³
In Section 6.1, I argue that PMM is at least sometimes rational. In
Section 6.2, I explain why non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating
¹ The terminology originates with Smith (1994, pp. 74–6).
² McGrath (2009) provides the inspiration for both the terminology and the chapter
title.
³ While I focus onmoralmotivation in this chapter, I believe the puzzle arises for every
kind of pure normative motivation.
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the rationality of PMM. In Section 6.3, I introduce two principles regarding
the conditions under which ﬁnal desires and preferences are rational. In
Sections 6.4 and 6.5, I draw on these principles to argue that synthetic
naturalism and non-naturalism both have trouble accommodating the
rationality of PMM. In Section 6.6, I explain why analytic naturalism has
trouble accommodating the rationality of PMM. Section 6.7 concludes.
6 .1 . THE RATIONALITY OF PMM
At the heart of moral practice lies moral inquiry. And at the heart of moral
inquiry lies the constitutive aim of discovering the moral truth; one cannot
engage in moral inquiry without having a desire to discover the moral truth.
People regularly engage in moral inquiry. So they must have a desire to
discover themoral truth.Whywould anyone want to discover themoral truth?
Any number of things might motivate someone to seek the moral truth.
They might get paid to do it. They might want to predict what virtuous
people will do in certain circumstances so they may exploit their virtuous
character. They might just be curious.
But this is not why most people seek the moral truth. Most people seek
the moral truth because they want to act in accordance with the moral truth.
They want to do the right thing as such.⁴ And they want to do it for its own
sake. They have a ﬁnal desire to do the right thing as such.⁵They exhibit PMM.
In this section, I argue that it can be rational to have PMM.⁶ I offer two
types of cases in which it’s rational to choose to engage in moral inquiry and
in which the best explanation of why ordinary people do this is that they
⁴ In desiring to do the right thing as such, one conceives of the thing one wants to do as
the right thing. One desires it under that description, the thing that has the property of being
right. When one has a merely de re desire to do the right thing, one conceives of the thing
one wants to do under some alternative guise—say, as the thing that saves the drowning
child. A de re desire to do the right thing counts as a desire to do the right thing because
the object of the desire is right, not because it’s conceived to be.
⁵ We can understand ﬁnal desires by contrasting them with instrumental desires. S’s
desire that P is an instrumental desire just in case S has that desire only because
(a) S desires something else Q, and (b) S believes that P raises the probability of Q either
by causing, realizing, or signifying Q. (When I say that S has that desire only because of these
further facts, I mean these further facts together constitute S’s sole rationale for that desire.)
S’s desire is a ﬁnal desire just in case S’s rationale for their desire does not consist only in pairs
of claims like (a) and (b) (cf. Harman, 2000; McDaniel and Bradley, 2008).
⁶ For purposes of this chapter, a motivation is rational if and only if the person who has
the motivation possesses at least some good reason of the right kind to have that
motivation and it’s their possession of this reason that sustains that motivation. For
someone to possess a reason to have some motivation, it isn’t enough that there be some
reason for them to have it: that reason must be within their ken (cf. Lord, 2015).
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have PMM. I argue that because in both types of cases the choice to engage
in moral inquiry is rational, the PMM that lies behind this choice must itself
be rational.
6.1.1. Pure Moral Inquiry with Full Information
Delilah owns a factory farm. She knows everything there is to know about
what goes on inside a factory farm. She also knows everything there is to
know about how factory farms impact the environment, the economy, and
people’s gustatory experiences. But Delilah has never thought about
whether it might be wrong to run a factory farm. Or maybe she has given
it some thought, but she hasn’t come to a settled view. She now faces a
decision: should she sink time and effort into trying to ﬁgure out whether
running a factory farm is right?
Suppose Delilah chooses to deliberate. She seems perfectly rational in
making this choice. Why would Delilah make this choice? Clearly, she has a
desire to know what’s morally right in this case. But presumably she doesn’t
want this bit of moral knowledge for its own sake. She wants it because she
wants to do what’s right.⁷
Importantly, this desire to do what’s right must be a desire to do what’s
right as such. If Delilah merely had a de re desire to do what’s right, then she
would desire to do it under some non-moral description. But if she wanted
to do what’s right under some non-moral description, she would already
know what act she would have to perform in order to satisfy her desire to do
what’s right—after all, she already knows all of the morally relevant non-
moral facts about the case. So she wouldn’t deliberate.
So when Delilah chooses to deliberate, she must be acting on a desire to
do what’s right as such.⁸Now suppose she doesn’t want to do the right thing
in order to avoid punishment, or as a way of doing what her mother wants,
or to conﬁrm that she’s bound for heaven. She wants it for its own sake. Her
desire to do what’s right is a ﬁnal desire. This shows that in choosing to
deliberate, Delilah is acting on PMM.
Is it rational for Delilah to have this PMM? Yes. Why? Because Delilah
acts rationally in choosing to deliberate. And if an agent rationally chooses to
⁷ Or at least, she wants to avoid doing what’s wrong.
⁸ Alternatively, she may be acting on a second-order ﬁnal (de dicto) desire to do
whatever ﬁnal desires constitute (de re) desires to do what’s right (Dreier, 2000,
p. 632). Or she may be acting on a desire to do what’s just or benevolent, as long as
justice and benevolence each are irreducibly moral or have an irreducibly moral compo-
nent Since these alternative desires essentially have moral content, they are still instances
of PMM. So what I go on to say about the de dicto desire to do what’s right applies just as
much to these desires.
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φ, then the desires she acts on in making that choice are rational.⁹ Thus, we
have a case in which PMM is rational.¹⁰
A Humean might object that this merely shows Delilah isn’t irrational in
acting on her PMM. They might hold that PMM is a deep-seated ﬁnal
desire that cannot itself be subject to rational assessment. I disagree. It seems
it would be rational for Delilah to act on PMM even if she knew that doing
so would likely defeat an even more deep-seated desire of hers (e.g., getting
rich). What this shows is that when we say Delilah’s PMM is rational, we’re
not just saying it’s immune to rational criticism. We’re saying that it’s
positively rational—that she has some good reason to have that desire.
Delilah’s case may sound strange. Does any actual person ever take
themselves to know all of the relevant non-moral facts and still engage in
moral inquiry by deliberating or seeking out pure moral testimony?
Indeed, pure moral inquiry of this kind is perfectly familiar. When people
ﬁnd themselves puzzling over whether it’s okay to get an abortion, whether
they’re giving enough to charity, or whether they should stop eating meat,
they aren’t always just wondering about how the world is in non-moral
respects. They often take themselves to know all of the relevant non-moral
facts. Likewise, people often go to an impartial third party to tell them how
to resolve a dispute, even when the third party knows no more about the
dispute than they do. In such cases, people rationally choose to engage in
moral inquiry, and the only plausible explanation of why they do so is that
they have PMM. So Delilah’s case is not all that unusual. PMM is common
and often rational.
6.1.2. Pure Moral Inquiry with Conceptual Limitations
Painfree has never felt pain before. He has just come across an opportunity
to torture some puppies, and he thinks this would be fun. But he stops to
ponder whether it would be right to do this. As he reﬂects, the village’s
moral expert swoops in and informs him that there is an experience he has
never had—pain—whose nature bears on whether it’s right to torture
puppies. (Suppose Painfree already has excellent reason to believe the
village’s moral expert is a moral expert.) The moral expert cannot tell
Painfree anything about the intrinsic nature of the experience. But the
⁹ While cases where it’s rational to desire that one act (or be disposed to act)
irrationally are familiar from the literature on rational irrationality, I know of no cases
in which someone acts rationally (i.e., responds adequately to their reasons) but in so
doing acts on an irrational desire.
¹⁰ Although my argument does not depend on it, I also believe Delilah is praiseworthy
(cf. Smith, 1994; Arpaly, 2002; Weatherson, 2014).
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expert does tell Painfree that what the experience is like bears on whether it’s
right to torture puppies. Unfortunately, just before the expert can tell
Painfree how it bears on whether it’s right, the expert gets hit by a bus.
Suppose then that the village sadist—having overheard Painfree’s con-
versation with the expert—walks up and offers Painfree the opportunity to
learn what pain feels like, free of charge. After deliberating, Painfree decides
to accept the sadist’s offer. Why would Painfree do this? He isn’t trying to
ﬁgure out whether “pain” refers to something he antecedently cares about—
he doesn’t know anything about pain, so he hasn’t any opinion about it. In
accepting the sadist’s offer, then, he must be trying to ﬁgure out whether
“pain” refers to something that it’s wrong to cause. Why does he want to
know this? He must want to know this because he wants to do what’s right.
Now suppose that Painfree does not think that doing what’s right as such
would promote the satisfaction of any of his other desires. It follows that his
desire must be a ﬁnal desire. Because a ﬁnal desire to do what’s right is an
instance of PMM, this shows that Painfree must have PMM.
It also shows that Painfree’s PMM is rational. Why? Because Painfree acts
rationally in accepting the sadist’s offer. And because Painfree acts on PMM
in accepting the sadist’s offer, his PMM must be rational. So we have
another case where PMM is rational.
While Delilah’s situation seems unusual, Painfree’s situationmight appear
fantastical. He is not merely uncertain which of various non-normative
ways the world might be is actual. There are certain non-normative ways
the world might be that he cannot even conceive. His ignorance is not
empirical; it’s conceptual.
Are we ever in Painfree’s position? Yes. This occurs whenever we know
there is some morally relevant non-moral fact whose nature we don’t know.
For example, one might think that how morally responsible an addict is for
the wrongs they commit in order to obtain drugs is partly a function of what
it’s like to be an addict, and that one cannot know this without having been
an addict. Likewise, perhaps there are morally relevant facts about living
through war or being oppressed that one cannot even imagine until one has
been to war or been oppressed.
In cases like these, we regularly defer to individuals who know morally
relevant facts that we cannot even conceive.We defer to recovering addicts on
the question of how to treat people who are in the grip of an addiction. We
defer to war veterans on howwe should treat prisoners of war. Andwe defer to
people who are oppressed on how they should be treated. In so doing, we are
acting on a ﬁnal desire to do what’s right as such—we are acting out of
PMM.And just as Painfree is rational to defer on the basis of PMM, so are we.
At this point, I take myself to have provided compelling evidence that
there are circumstances in which it’s rational to have PMM. I assume in
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what follows that any adequate metaethics ought to account for this fact—
and I argue that it’s surprisingly difﬁcult to see how any of the standard
views in metaethics could. Those who remain unconvinced by the argu-
ments in this section can interpret what follows as an argument for a
conditional claim: if PMM is rational, then it’s hard to see how any of the
standard views in metaethics could accommodate that fact.
6 .2 . NON-COGNITIVISM
According to cognitivism, moral judgments are (genuine, full-ﬂedged)
beliefs. They’re in the business of describing reality, of attributing moral
properties to actions, people, and states of affairs. They can be true or false in
a non-deﬂationary, non-minimalist sense. Non-cognitivism is the denial of
cognitivism.
Non-cognitivism comes in many ﬂavors. But all pure versions of non-
cognitivism share one feature in virtue of which they are incompatible with
the rationality of PMM: they deny that we have moral concepts that
represent genuine moral properties.¹¹ This shared assumption makes it
impossible for non-cognitivism to explain how it could be rational to have
PMM since it implies that it’s not possible to have PMM in the ﬁrst place.¹²
The reason why is that PMM is a ﬁnal desire to (e.g.) do what’s right as
such—to do the right thing under that description—and it is thereby partly
constituted by a moral concept that represents a genuine moral property.
Since non-cognitivism denies the existence of such concepts, it must deny
the existence of PMM.
This shows non-cognitivism cannot solve the puzzle of PMM, narrowly
construed. But it does not show that it cannot solve the puzzle of PMM,
broadly construed. The puzzle of PMM, broadly construed, is to explain
how it can be rational to engage in (pure) moral inquiry. I argued that we
must assume people act on PMM because this provides the best explanation
of why people engage in moral inquiry. The non-cognitivist denies the
existence of PMM. In its place, they must ﬁnd some other mental state—
let us call it non-cognitivist PMM or NCPMM—that it’s rational to have and
¹¹ Even if the non-cognitivist can “earn the right” to speak of such concepts, a
commitment to these concepts does not ﬁgure in their ground-level account of moral
thought and talk (Blackburn, 1998).
¹² For purposes of this chapter, I assimilate hybrid versions of non-cognitivism (e.g.,
Ridge, 2014; Toppinen, 2013; Schroeder, 2013) to the naturalistic views I go on to
discuss. While they may be able to account for the possibility of PMM, it’s unclear
whether they can account for the rationality of PMM. Thanks to Mike Ridge for
discussion.
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that can play the same role as PMM in explaining why people engage in
moral inquiry. Only by identifying such a state can they solve the puzzle of
PMM, broadly construed.
In order to evaluate whether NCPMM satisﬁes these two desiderata, we
need a better idea of what it could be. The non-cognitivist has two options.
They can either identity NCPMM with a desire that has exclusively non-
moral content, or else they can identify it with a motivational state that lacks
representational content altogether. I will consider each strategy in turn.
I will argue that while both can explain why people engage in moral inquiry,
neither can explain why people are rational in doing so.
On the ﬁrst strategy, the non-cognitivist must ﬁnd some ﬁnal desire
whose content doesn’t involve a moral property, and this desire must be
able to explain why we engage in moral inquiry. I submit that the only
motivational state that satisﬁes this job description is a ﬁnal desire to engage
in moral inquiry. If the non-cognitivist attempted to identify NCPMM
with any other desire (e.g., the desire to do what one would want to do after
engaging in moral inquiry or to do what one’s true self wants to do), there
would be overwhelming pressure to identify the content of this desire with
doing what’s right. And this would just be to abandon non-cognitivism in
favor of some form of naturalism. So the only desire the non-cognitivist can
identify with NCPMM is a ﬁnal desire to engage in moral inquiry.
If the non-cognitivist chooses to identify NCPMM with a ﬁnal desire
to engage in moral inquiry, then they will have shown that NCPMM can
explain why people engage in moral inquiry. But in order to solve the puzzle
of PMM, broadly construed, they must show that it’s rational to have this
state. And in fact, it doesn’t seem rational to have this state. While it might
be rational to have an instrumental desire to engage in moral inquiry—as a
way of doing something intellectually stimulating, or as a way of increasing
the probability of doing what’s right—it isn’t rational to have a ﬁnal desire
to engage in moral inquiry.
Now consider the second strategy. On this strategy, the non-cognitivist
identiﬁes NCPMM with a motivational state that has no representational
content whatsoever and yet can still explain why people engage in moral
inquiry.¹³ Such a state would have to be a brute disposition to φ when
one has the belief that φ-ing will increase the probability that one does
what’s right.¹⁴
If the non-cognitivist chooses to identify PMM with such a brute
disposition, they will have shown that NCPMM can explain why people
¹³ Thanks to Eric Hubble for offering this line of response in conversation.
¹⁴ Or the categorical basis of such a disposition.
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engage in moral inquiry. But again, in order to solve the puzzle of PMM
they must show that it’s rational to have this state. And it doesn’t seem
rational to have this state, because it doesn’t seem that this brute disposition
is the kind of state that it can be rational or irrational to have in the ﬁrst
place. While some brute dispositions might be rational to have, this doesn’t
seem to be one of them. Perhaps it’s rational to have the brute disposition to
believe P when you believe Q and Q is good evidence for P. But the brute
disposition to engage in moral inquiry when you believe that doing so will
lead you to do what’s right is not like a disposition to respond appropriately
to one’s reasons. It’s more like a pure association, a mere tendency to pass
from one mental state to another. While it might be rational to try to
cultivate in oneself brute dispositions of this sort, the dispositions them-
selves are not rational or irrational. There is no right kind of reason to have
states like these.
But suppose for the sake of argument that it’s rational to have this brute
disposition. If this were true, then the non-cognitivist would have found a
state that it’s rational to have and that can explain why people engage in
moral inquiry. But that is not yet to solve the puzzle of PMM, broadly
construed. In order to do that, the non-cognitivist must show that not only
having this brute disposition but acting on it—i.e., engaging in moral
inquiry—is rational. I will now argue that they cannot do this.
If we grant that it’s rational to have the disposition in question, what
obstacle is there to concluding that it’s rational to act on this disposition?
Recall that the disposition in question is a disposition to φ when one has the
belief that φ-ing will increase the probability that one does what’s right. I will
argue that once we have a better understanding of what this belief is
according to non-cognitivism, we will see that acting on this brute dispos-
ition is not rational.
I have called the state in question a “belief.” But this belief appears to have
moral content. As such, the non-cognitivist cannot take it at face value.
They must reduce it either to a genuine belief with non-moral content, or
else to a pro-attitude of some kind. On either option, the moral inquirer
comes out looking irrational.
First, consider the possibility that the “belief ” in question is a pro-
attitude. As a pro-attitude, it must be a pro-attitude toward something or
other. And it seems the only thing that could be the object of this pro-
attitude is the act, whatever it is, that one would perform after engaging in
moral inquiry. This makes the pro-attitude into a ﬁnal de dicto desire to do
what one would do after engaging in moral inquiry. Unfortunately, a ﬁnal de
dicto desire to do what one would do after engaging in moral inquiry and
other desires like this are not desires it’s rational to have. As I argue in
Section 6.6 against a version of analytic naturalism, it can often make sense
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to have an instrumental desire to do what one would do after engaging in
moral inquiry, but it’s bizarre to want to do whatever one would do after
engaging in moral inquiry for its own sake. So if the non-cognitivist reduces
the belief in question to a pro-attitude, they cannot vindicate the rationality
of engaging in moral inquiry, and so fail to solve the puzzle of PMM,
broadly construed.
Now consider the possibility that the belief in question is a genuine belief
with non-moral content. If so, it would have to be the belief that engaging in
moral inquiry increases the likelihood that one will give money to charity, or
help an elderly person across the street, or . . . , where each disjunct is an
action, naturalistically described, toward which one already takes the pro-
attitude required by the non-cognitivist to count as judging that action to be
right. The problem with this proposal is that it cannot explain why any
rational person would bother to engage in moral inquiry. Why? Because it
implies that people who engage in moral inquiry already have a settled view
about which of their options they ought to take. But this makes people who
engage in moral inquiry look irrational, for it means they already have an
answer to the question they pursue in moral inquiry. Genuinely inquiring
whether P when one is already certain that P is, if not impossible, irrational.
So again, the non-cognitivist cannot vindicate the rationality of engaging in
moral inquiry, and so fails to solve the puzzle of PMM, broadly construed.
6.3 . AN EPISTEMIC CONSTRAINT
In Sections 6.4 and 6.5, I evaluate synthetic naturalism and non-naturalism.
In evaluating these views, I draw on the following principle:
The Epistemic Constraint on Rational Final Desire. For any property
P, if you do not know P’s essence, it is not rational to ﬁnally desire that
P be instantiated as such.¹⁵
Why endorse this Epistemic Constraint? Suppose that I have never before
experienced the taste of Vegemite. In fact, I have only just now learned that
Vegemite exists. Upon learning that it exists, I ﬁnd myself overcome with a
¹⁵ What is the essence of a property? For these purposes, the essence of a property is
what makes that property the property it is. It is the property’s complete intrinsic nature.
The complete intrinsic nature of a simple property is a matter of what it is in itself. The
complete intrinsic nature of a complex property is a matter of what simple properties and
relations it’s made up of, and what those properties and relations are in themselves.
Importantly, necessary features of a property may not be part of its essence. It may be a
necessary feature of goodness that God loves it without God loving it being part of its
essence (cf. Fine, 1994).
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desire to taste Vegemite as such.¹⁶ And this isn’t just any desire. It’s a ﬁnal
desire. My rationale for wanting to taste Vegemite isn’t that doing so will
increase the probability that some other desire of mine will be satisﬁed. My
rationale is that it’s tasting Vegemite.
Is it rational for me to have the Vegemite Desire? It isn’t. Why? Because
I don’t know enough about what it’s like to taste Vegemite—I don’t know
enough about the intrinsic nature of the experience. All I know about it is
that it’s a taste experience. I need to know more—I need to know something
about the Vegemite taste—before I can rationally desire it for its own sake.
How much more? Suppose I learn a bit more about the intrinsic nature of
Vegemite’s taste without learning its essence—I learn that Vegemite’s taste
is, among other things, salty. Can I rationally have a ﬁnal desire to taste
Vegemite as such once I know this much?
No. At best, I could rationally have a ﬁnal desire to taste something
salty as such. And this ﬁnal desire is not the same as a ﬁnal desire to taste
Vegemite as such.
To see why I’m only in a position to rationally have a ﬁnal desire to taste
something salty as such, consider how I would go about explaining why
I desire to taste Vegemite. If asked why I desire to taste Vegemite, I could
not rationally say that it’s because it’s Vegemite. The only rational answer
I could give is that I desire to taste Vegemite because it tastes salty. And this
reveals that my desire to taste Vegemite is not a ﬁnal desire. It’s an
instrumental desire based on my ﬁnal desire to taste something salty and
my means-end belief that tasting Vegemite is a way of tasting something
salty. This same line of reasoning can be repeated for any version of the case
in which my knowledge of how Vegemite tastes falls short of knowing its
essence. Furthermore, it can be repeated for any case in which I desire
something whose essence I don’t know. There’s nothing special here about
the nature of subjective experience. Whenever I lack knowledge of an
object’s essence, my desire for that object can only be instrumental if it is
to be rational.¹⁷
It may seem that the Epistemic Constraint on Rational Final Desire
makes rational ﬁnal desire hard to come by. For example, many think that
if it’s rational to have a ﬁnal desire for anything as such, it’s rational to have a
¹⁶ Assume my concept of Vegemite directly refers to Vegemite. It’s in virtue of
deploying this concept that I manage to have a desire to taste Vegemite as such rather
than, e.g., a desire to taste what everyone actually refers to using the term “Vegemite.”
¹⁷ Experiencing the taste of Vegemite can allow one to know the essence of that
experience only if property dualism is true. Even if property dualism is false, the Epistemic
Constraint is compatible with the existence of a rational ﬁnal desire in the vicinity: the
ﬁnal desire to have whatever experience I know under such-and-such a mode of presen-
tation (i.e., the phenomenal character of tasting Vegemite).
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ﬁnal desire for knowledge as such. But the lesson of the literature responding
to Gettier’s seminal (1963) article is that we don’t know the essence of
knowledge. So if the Epistemic Constraint on Rational Final Desire is
correct, ﬁnal desires for knowledge as such are not rational. Since they are
rational, the Epistemic Constraint on Rational Final Desire faces an appar-
ent counterexample.
Whether this objection succeeds depends on whether we know the
essence of what we ﬁnally desire. Take the case of knowledge. The failure
of the Gettier literature doesn’t show that we don’t know the essence of
knowledge. People have strong intuitions about whether knowledge obtains
in Gettier cases. If this ability to determine whether knowledge obtains
extends to all possible cases, then we seem to have at least tacit knowledge of
knowledge’s essence. And this may be all that’s required to make ﬁnal desires
for knowledge rational.
But even if our ability to determine whether knowledge obtains does not
extend to all possible cases, we may still know the essence of knowledge in
some other way, so long as its essence does not consist in what falls within its
extension. If we don’t—if the essence of knowledge consists in what falls
within its extension and we don’t know what falls within its extension—
then the Epistemic Constraint seems to get the right result: it isn’t rational
to ﬁnally desire knowledge. If it were, it would be rational for someone to
ﬁnally desire to have knowledge in some case, to not know whether they
have knowledge in that case, and to know all of the other facts about that
case. But clearly someone who knew all the facts that could ground their
having knowledge (whether their belief was true, reliably formed, etc.) and
yet did not know whether they have knowledge could not rationally have a
ﬁnal desire that they have knowledge. This person would irrationally desire
they know-not-what.
Even so, there are other cases where it clearly seems rational to have a ﬁnal
desire for P as such even though one clearly does not know P’s essence. For
example, most people want Mom to be happy as such. (Suppose “Mom”
directly refers to one’s own mother.) Even supposing people know the
essence of happiness, no one knows the essence of Mom. And yet people
have a ﬁnal desire that Mom is happy as such, and they seem to be rational in
having this desire.
This shows there is a class of exceptions to the Epistemic Constraint.
What uniﬁes this class? Notice that the rationale for the Mom Desire must
involve facts about Mom’s extrinsic nature. If asked why one wants Mom to
be happy, one’s reply must be something like “Mom gave birth to me” or
“Mom raised me” or “Mom and I are pretty close.” These replies all invoke
facts about Mom’s extrinsic properties. This suggests that you can be
rational in having a ﬁnal desire for an object when you don’t know
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the essence of that object so long as you know the essence of that object’s
extrinsic nature and the object’s extrinsic nature makes the object worth caring
about for its own sake.
Having noticed that there is this class of exceptions to the Epistemic
Constraint, we can safely ignore it. In what follows, I argue that synthetic
naturalism and non-naturalism cannot vindicate the rationality of PMM
because the Epistemic Constraint is true and these views imply that we don’t
know the essence of any moral property. Even though the Epistemic
Constraint has exceptions, it isn’t plausible to resist this argument by saying
that PMM constitutes such an exception. This is because facts about the
extrinsic nature of moral properties play no part in any virtuous person’s
rationale for having PMM. If asked why they desire to do the right thing,
neither Delilah nor Painfree would cite anything about the extrinsic nature
of rightness—they wouldn’t say “Because my mother wants me to do
the right thing.” They would say “Because it’s right.” So even if there are
exceptions to the Epistemic Constraint, PMM isn’t one of them.
Although the arguments in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are stated most suc-
cinctly using this principle, I will now offer a second, less controversial
principle that can do the same work. This is the Epistemic Constraint on
Rational Final Preference: for any two properties X and Y, if you cannot
distinguish the intrinsic nature of X from the intrinsic nature of Y, you
cannot remain rational while ﬁnally desiring the instantiation of X as such
more than you ﬁnally desire the instantiation of Y as such. So if I have just
learned not only that Vegemite exists, but that there is another substance—
Marmite—that also exists, and all I know about the intrinsic nature of either
is that they’re salty, then I cannot rationally desire to taste one more than the
other. This result is eminently plausible, and its plausibility does not turn on
anything speciﬁc about taste sensations. So the Epistemic Constraint on
Rational Final Preference poses an equally severe problem for the standard
views in metaethics: the problem of explaining why it’s rational to want to
do what’s right more than what’s not right.
6 .4. SYNTHETIC NATURALISM
According to synthetic naturalism, moral properties are identical to natural
properties, and statements identifying moral properties with natural prop-
erties are synthetic, a posteriori truths. The most prominent version of
synthetic naturalism is Cornell Realism, and the most prominent defender
of Cornell Realism is Richard Boyd. I will argue that our Epistemic Con-
straints show that synthetic naturalist views such as Boyd’s cannot easily
account for the rationality of PMM.
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Boyd models his metasemantics for moral concepts on the externalist
metasemantics for natural kind concepts championed by Kripke and
Putnam. On this view, a concept has the referent that it does in virtue of
standing in an appropriate causal relation to its referent. A key upshot of his
view is that, just as we can have the concept of “water” without knowing that
the essence of water is H₂O, we can possess a concept that refers to the
property of being right without knowing the essence of that property: “we
can and do refer to things such that we certainly don’t intend to refer to
them under anything like the descriptions which in fact identify their true
natures” (Boyd, 2003, p. 549). Moreover, we will not know the essence of
the property of being right until we reach the end of moral inquiry: “The
question of just which properties and mechanisms belong in the deﬁnition
of [the property of being right] is an a posteriori question—often a difﬁcult
theoretical one.” (Boyd, 1988, p. 197)
Boyd takes this to be a positive feature of the view, for it enables it to
accommodate Moorean open questions. As Moore observed, for any natural
property N, it appears to be an open question whether anything that has
that property is good. This is allegedly problematic for a naturalist view
on which the identity of goodness with N is analytic. If the identity of
goodness with N is settled by the meaning of “goodness” and “N,” how
could people who are competent with the concepts expressed by these terms
question the identity of goodness and N?
Open questions are no embarrassment for Cornell Realism, for Cornell
Realism predicts that competent speakers would ﬁnd even true identity
claims to have the appearance of being open. On this view, the identity of
N with goodness is a synthetic, a posteriori truth, not a conceptual truth: “If
the good is deﬁned by a homeostatic phenomenon the details of which we
still do not entirely know, then it is a paradigm case of a property whose
‘essence’ is given by a natural rather than a stipulative deﬁnition” (Boyd,
1988, p. 210) Because one can refer to the property of being right (or in this
case, the property of being good) without knowing its essence, someone
who hasn’t reached the end of inquiry can competently doubt that any given
N constitutes its essence, even if it does.
The problem for Cornell Realism should by now be obvious. The feature
of Cornell Realism that allows it to accommodate Moorean open questions
is ultimately a bug. It’s a bug because, together with the Epistemic Con-
straint on Rational Final Desire, it falsely implies that PMM is not rational.
The argument is simple. According to the Epistemic Constraint on
Rational Final Desire, it’s never rational to have a ﬁnal desire for the instan-
tiation of some property P as such if you don’t know the essence of P.
According to Cornell Realism, no one knows the essence of the property of
being right. (And no one will, until they reach the end of moral inquiry.)
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Therefore, if Cornell Realism is true, it’s never rational for ordinary people
engaged in moral inquiry to have a ﬁnal desire to do the right thing as such.
Since it’s rational for ordinary people engaged in moral inquiry to have this
desire, this poses a serious problem for Cornell Realism.
I have just argued against Cornell Realism relying on the Epistemic Con-
straint on Final Desire. But the Epistemic Constraint on Rational Final
Preference poses an equally severe problem for Cornell Realism: that of
explaining why it’s rational to want more strongly to do what’s right as such
than to do what’s not right as such. To see why, consider that whatever the
property of being right is, there will be a very similar property being right*
which is just like being right, except that its essence doesn’t include φ-ing.
Suppose we have an agent who is in a “hard case” and is thus unsure whether
φ-ing is right. Suppose this person wants to do what’s right as such for its own
sake.Nowwe can ask this person: why not desire to dowhat’s right* for its own
sake instead? After all, doing what’s right* and doing what’s right appear to you
to be indistinguishable. Youmay know that φ-ing lies within the essence of one
and not the other, but you don’t know whether it lies within the essence of
doing what’s right or the essence of doing what’s right*. So why, then, ﬁnally
prefer to do the right thing rather than the right* thing? If the Epistemic
Constraint on Rational Final Preference is true, what rationality requires in
this case is indifference. But since it does seem rational to ﬁnally prefer doing
what’s right overwhat’s right*, this poses a serious problem forCornell Realism.
6.5 . NON-NATURALISM
Non-naturalism is a form of cognitivism, but it denies that moral properties
are identical with natural properties. Instead, it takes moral properties to be
a species of non-natural properties. Is non-naturalism compatible with the
rationality of PMM?
If non-naturalism is to allow for the rationality of PMM, then non-naturalism
must avoid the problem faced by synthetic naturalism; it must allow everyday
people to know the essence of moral properties. But it must also avoid a familiar
objection to non-naturalism: that non-natural moral properties are not worth
caring about for their own sake. These two desiderata must be satisﬁed if non-
naturalism is to solve the puzzle of PMM.
Consider the second desideratum ﬁrst. Some have thought that non-
natural properties cannot be worth caring about for their own sake. Here is a
characteristic remark from Frank Jackson:
Are we supposed to take seriously someone who says, “I see that this action will kill
many and save no-one, but that is not enough to justify my not doing it; what really
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matters is that the action has an extra property that only ethical terms are suited to
pick out”? In short, the extra properties would [be] ethical “idlers”. (1998, p. 127)
Some non-naturalists reply to Jackson’s challenge by claiming that they
never took non-natural moral properties to be worth caring about for their
own sake in the ﬁrst place.¹⁸ This reply, however, simply concedes that non-
naturalism cannot solve the puzzle of PMM. Fortunately, we can ﬁnd non-
naturalists who believe non-natural moral properties are worth caring about.
For example, inOnWhat MattersDerek Parﬁt repeatedly claims that if there
are no non-natural moral properties, “Sidgwick, Ross, and I, and others
would have wasted much of our lives” (2011, pp. 12, 304, 367) But why
think non-natural moral properties have an essence that makes them worth
caring about?
At this point, the best bet for the non-naturalist is to give up on
describing the essence of being right and to just claim that the essence of
being right, ineffable as it is, makes it worth caring about for its own sake.
Just as someone pressed to explain why they desire pleasure for its own
sake can do no more than point to the nature of the experience itself,
someone pressed to explain why they desire to do what’s right for its own
sake may be able to do no more than point to the nature of being right.¹⁹
“To know it is to love it,” they might say.
However plausible this move is, it will not allow the non-naturalist to
solve the PMM. And that is because non-naturalism fails the ﬁrst desider-
atum considered above: it cannot explain how ordinary moral inquirers
could know the essence of a non-natural moral property. In order to show
that this desideratum is satisﬁed, the non-naturalist must show that it’s
possible to stand in a special relation of acquaintance with that property, a
relation that delivers knowledge of its essence.²⁰ Moreover, they must show
that ordinary moral inquirers actually stand in this relation to non-natural
moral properties. I will argue that standard versions of non-naturalism
cannot show this.
What would an essence-revealing relation of acquaintance look like? The
most vivid example of such a relation comes from visual experience. Articu-
lating a view he attributes to Bertrand Russell, Mark Johnston writes that
“one naturally does take and should take one’s visual experience as of, e.g., a
canary yellow surface, as completely revealing the intrinsic nature of canary
yellow, so that canary yellow is counted as having just those intrinsic and
¹⁸ See, e.g., FitzPatrick (2014, p. 564). ¹⁹ Cf. Moore (1903, p. 7).
²⁰ The kind of acquaintance I have in mind corresponds to what Dasgupta (2015,
p. 464) has in mind: “Let us say that a subject S is acquainted with x iff the nature of x is
directly presented or revealed to S (this is just a label, not an analysis).”
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 24/2/2018, SPi
The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation 137
Comp. by: ANEESKUMAR A Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0003430211 Date:24/2/18
Time:17:56:28 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0003430211.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 138
essential features which are evident in an experience as of canary yellow”
(1992, p. 223). Likewise, it’s plausible to think that the essence of Vege-
mite’s taste is completely revealed to someone who tastes Vegemite.
The case of canary yellow provides a model for how the essence of a
property can be revealed through experience. But standard versions of
non-naturalism reject the idea that moral properties are the kinds of prop-
erties we can be acquainted with in conscious experience.²¹ So what other
option is there?
Perhaps standing in a special causal relation to an entity can give one
knowledge of its essence, even if that causal relation doesn’t give rise to any
conscious experience of the object’s nature. Unfortunately, standard ver-
sions of non-naturalism hold that moral properties are causally inert.²² So
this proposal is also a non-starter for standard versions of non-naturalism.
It would be too quick to conclude at this point that we don’t know
the essence of non-natural moral properties. After all, it’s plausible to think
we know the essence of certain logical relations and mathematical entities,
but it isn’t plausible to think we’re causally connected to or immediately
acquainted with them (Dasgupta, 2015, pp. 464–5; Chalmers, 2012,
p. 404). So how does one come to know the essence of a logical or
mathematical entity? A natural proposal is that we have this knowledge by
having logical and mathematical concepts that play an appropriate role in
our cognitive economy (Chalmers, 2012, p. 466). Can a similar proposal
show that we know the essence of non-natural moral properties? Whether
such a story could be told depends on whether an appropriate conceptual
role can be found for our moral concepts. I will consider two proposals.
On the ﬁrst proposal, the appropriate conceptual role consists in being
able to apply the concept in exactly those cases in which it’s correctly
applied. This proposal holds that one might know a moral property’s
essence by knowing the complete truth about what lies in its extension
across all possible worlds. Unfortunately, this proposal is a non-starter, for
the cases where PMM appears most clearly rational—cases of people
engaging in moral inquiry—are precisely cases where people lack knowledge
of what lies in the property’s extension. So non-naturalists who accept this
proposal cannot deliver the verdict that PMM is rational.
²¹ For possible exceptions, see Oddie (2005), Atiq (unpublished manuscript), and
Johnston (2001).
²² For exceptions, see Shafer-Landau (2012), Wedgwood (2007), Cuneo (2006), and
Oddie (2005). Although these views allow for causal efﬁcacy, more work needs to be done
to show that this causal efﬁcacy allows us to know the essence of any moral entity
(cf. Langton, 1998; Lewis, 2009; Locke, 2009; and Dasgupta, 2015).
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On the second proposal, the appropriate conceptual role has less to do
with our disposition to apply the concept and more to do with how we
behave once we’ve applied it. Indeed, Ralph Wedgwood and David Enoch
have offered such accounts in an attempt to explain how we can come to
think about non-natural moral properties in the ﬁrst place (Wedgwood,
2007; Enoch, 2011). Can such accounts also explain how we could know a
moral property’s essence?
No. On these views, a mental representation refers to a non-natural moral
property in virtue of playing a certain “downstream” conceptual role. For
example, on Wedgwood’s view, I count as competent with the concept of
being what I ought to do just in case believing that I ought to φ commits me
(in the relevant sense) to φ-ing. This is a very easy condition to satisfy.
Indeed, it doesn’t require that I have any true beliefs about what I ought to
do. I could believe the only thing I ever ought to do is torture puppies for
fun and yet still count as competent with the concept of being what I ought to
do, so long as in believing that I ought to torture puppies I commit myself
(in the relevant sense) to torturing puppies (cf. Schroeter and Schroeter,
2009, pp. 4–9; Gibbard, 2003, pp. 28–29, 149–50).
Even if Wedgwood’s view is correct as an account of how our thoughts
manage to latch onto the non-natural moral property of being what I ought to
do, the present case shows that this account cannot also show that we know
that property’s essence. This is because it’s implausible to think that I could
believe that the only thing I ever ought to do is torture puppies while at the
same time knowing the essence of being what I ought to do. Although it’s
plausible to think that knowing the essence of being what I ought to do is
compatible with not knowing what has that property in hard cases, it isn’t at
all plausible to think that someone could know that property’s essence while
simultaneously believing that all they ought to do is torture puppies.
Knowing a moral property’s essence can’t come that far apart from know-
ledge of what lies in its extension.
I have argued that non-naturalism cannot vindicate the rationality of
PMM because it cannot show how ordinary moral inquirers could know any
moral property’s essence. This argument goes through only if the Epistemic
Constraint on Rational Final Desire is true. But the same conclusion can be
reached using the Epistemic Constraint on Rational Final Preference. The
problem is that non-naturalism has a hard time explaining how we could
learn how the essence of being right differed from, say, the essence of being
right*. The typical routes by which we would come to know this difference
are closed off: we aren’t acquainted with them in experience, and we don’t
causally interact with them. And it’s hard to see how having a concept that
plays the role speciﬁed by Wedgwood could tell us anything about the
essence of being right—or at least anything that wasn’t also shared by being
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right*. Lastly, we might know that the action we are inquiring about falls
into the extension of the one but not the extension of the other, but we
don’t know which—if we did, we wouldn’t have to deliberate. So even if we
reject the Epistemic Constraint on Rational Final Desire, the Epistemic
Constraint on Rational Final Preference creates an equally serious problem
for standard versions of non-naturalism.
6.6. ANALYTIC NATURALISM
According to analytic naturalism, moral properties are identical to natural
properties, and the relevant identity statements are analytic truths. Different
versions of the view identify different moral properties with different natural
properties, but all versions agree that the correct identities are analytic truths.
The leading variant of analytic naturalism is moral functionalism,
defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (Jackson, 1998; Jackson and
Pettit, 1995). According to moral functionalism, the property of being right
(e.g.) is the property of having the property that plays the rightness role in
mature folk morality, and this is an analytic truth.²³
Unlike Cornell Realism and non-naturalism, moral functionalism allows
that everyday people who are competent with moral concepts know the
essence of the properties these concepts refer to. They may not be able to
articulate a set of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions that captures this
essence, but they nevertheless have tacit knowledge of it. So moral func-
tionalism succeeds where Cornell Realism and non-naturalism fail.
But moral functionalism faces a problem of its own: although it allows
ordinary inquirers to know the essences of moral properties, it takes the
essences of these properties to be such that that we have no reason to care
about them for their own sake. This is because it identiﬁes the property of
being right with the property of having the property that plays the rightness
role in mature folk morality.
According to Jackson, folk morality is “the network of moral opinions,
intuitions, principles and concepts whose mastery is part and parcel of
having a sense of what’s right and wrong, and of being able to engage in
²³ In their initial statement of the view, Jackson and Pettit remain neutral on whether
rightness should be identiﬁed with the property of having the property that plays the
rightness role (i.e., the property of having the realizer property) or with the property that
plays the rightness role (i.e., the realizer property itself ). If we understand rightness to
be the property of being right, then the latter interpretation makes moral functionalism
into a version of synthetic naturalism, a version that fails for the same reason that
Cornell Realism fails: it implies that ordinary moral inquirers don’t know the essence of
being right.
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meaningful debate about what ought to be done” (Jackson, 1998, p. 130).
Mature folk morality is “where folk morality will end up after it has been
exposed to debate and critical reﬂection (or would end up, should we keep at
it consistently and not become extinct too soon)” (Jackson, 1998, p. 133). So,
roughly, the property of being right is the property we would treat as right if
we took our ordinary sense of right and wrong and cleaned it up by thinking
and arguing for a long time. Unfortunately, whether an act instantiates this
property doesn’t seem to matter for its own sake. Why should we care for its
own sake about doing what we would treat as right under such conditions?
A satisfactory answer to this question would have to come by way of a
richer description of what it would be to treat something as right under such
conditions, which Jackson supplies. According to Jackson, “to believe that
something is right is to believe in part that it is what we would in ideal
circumstances desire,” and being what we would in ideal circumstances
desire is part of what it is to have a property that plays the rightness role
in mature folk morality (1998, p. 159). This suggests that to desire that we
do the right thing is to desire in part that we do what we would desire if we
were fully informed, coherent, etc. as such.²⁴ And doesn’t it make sense to care
for its own sake about whether you’re doing what you would desire under
such ideal conditions?
No. It may make sense to care instrumentally about the fact that an act
would be what we would in ideal circumstances desire—after all, this fact
strongly suggests that the act has a distinct property that’s worth caring
about for its own sake. But it makes little sense to care for its own sake about
the fact that φ-ing would be what we would in ideal circumstances desire. At
least, it doesn’t make sense to care as strongly about this fact as it does to care
about whether we do what’s right. Caring so strongly about whether our act
satisﬁes the desires we would have in ideal conditions for its own sake seems
fetishistic. So if moral functionalism identiﬁes our strong desire to do what’s
right with a strong desire to do what we would in ideal circumstances desire,
it can’t explain why it would be rational for us to engage in moral inquiry as
frequently as we rationally engage in moral inquiry.
6 .7 . CONCLUSION
I have argued that the standard views in metaethics all have trouble vindi-
cating the rationality of PMM. Although the prospects for non-cognitivism
²⁴ A move like this makes moral functionalism into a type of ideal observer or ideal
advisor theory (e.g., Firth, 1952; Smith, 1994).
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and synthetic naturalism are bleak, some plausible form of analytic naturalism
or non-naturalism may yet be developed that can solve the puzzle of
PMM. While it isn’t clear what that view will look like in all its details, we
know in advance that it will have two features that no standard view has both
of. First, unlike standard versions of synthetic naturalism and non-naturalism,
it will have to allow that everyday moral inquirers know the essence of
moral properties despite not knowing whether the acts they inquire about
lie in their extension. Second, unlike standard versions of analytic naturalism,
the essences it assigns to moral properties must make those properties worth
caring about for their own sake.
It remains an open question whether there is an adequate view that can
satisfy both of these constraints. But we have reason to be optimistic. Since
each constraint is satisﬁed by at least one of the standard views, we know
that each constraint can be satisﬁed in principle. And we have no reason to
doubt they can both be satisﬁed by a single view.
Suppose it turns out that these constraints can’t both be satisﬁed by a
single view. We then have a choice. We can either conclude these are not
genuine constraints, or we can take the fact that no view satisﬁes them as a
new argument for error theory about morality. I myself would be inclined
toward error theory. But that is an argument for another day.²⁵
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